

































An applied general equilibrium model with oligopoly and scale economies, based on detailed plant-level 
data, is used to contrast the impacts of the Morocco-EU free trade area (FTA) to multilateral trade 
liberalization on Morocco’s economy. Simulation results show that the FTA agreement is likely to have 
adverse effects on Morocco due to: (a) deteriorating terms of trade, (b) reductions in output per firm in 
industries dominated by scale economies, (c) diversion of imports away from non-EU suppliers, and (d) 
potentially adverse effects on the aggregate demand for labor. We contrast this FTA with a multilateral 
liberalization scenario along the lines of those proposed under the Doha Development Round and find this 
more beneficial to Morocco, with overall welfare gains due to: (a) lesser terms of trade losses, (b) positive 
scale effects, (c) non-preferential liberalization of imports into Morocco, and (d) a positive impact on 
aggregate labor demand. We conclude that Morocco would be better off pursuing trade liberalization in 
the multilateral arena. 
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I. Introduction  
Morocco and the European Union (EU) signed an association agreement (henceforth referred to as FTA) 
in 1996, which entered into effect in March 2000.  This Agreement was part of a broader Euro-
Mediterranean initiative, the 1996 Barcelona Protocol, in which the European Union negotiated free trade 
agreements with Southern Mediterranean countries. The association agreement with Morocco is a partial 
free trade agreement as it calls for free trade in industrial goods to be phased in over 12 years, but 
excludes selected agricultural goods. The latter continue to be regulated by existing preferential 
agreements that allow for low or no tariffs within pre-specified quantities1. The FTA effectively translates 
into a unilateral liberalization of domestic industries by Morocco as the latter already benefit from duty–
free access for its exports to the EU due to previous preferential agreements2. In return, the EU promised 
financial assistance to help the Moroccan industries transition to open competition through investment 
and training.  
FTAs between industrial and developing economies are expected to have much deeper economic 
effects on the latter (Panagariya, 2002). This is because developing countries typically rely more on trade 
and have smaller and more poorly functioning markets, and hence more sensitive to international 
competition than industrialized economies. In the case of Morocco, the FTA is expected to affect more 
than trade patterns, deeply altering its manufacturing structure as well.  Since the 1960’s, Morocco’s 
industrial sectors have followed a narrow range of specializations, focusing mostly on goods exported to 
the European market. Moroccan manufacturing activities have also expanded via import substitution in 
those domestic industries shielded by high tariffs. In addition, lacking functioning competition rules, 
these industries have become dominated by just a few firms, with substantial market power.  
The critical role of market structure in the Moroccan economy can be readily gleaned from Table 1 
(last column), which shows data from the 1995 manufacturing census3.  Ten out of 18 two-digit industries 
show a four-plant concentration (C4) ratio over 70 percent and four of them exceed 50 percent. The most 
concentrated sectors include beverages & tobacco and sugar processing, while textiles and clothing 
exhibit relatively low levels of concentration.  Private industrial ownership (domestic and foreign) 
dominates (columns 2 and 3).  It is important to note that these concentration ratios understate the 
potential market power exercised by domestic industries, due to the fact that a small number of holding 
companies own industrial firms accounting for about half of manufacturing value-added (World Bank, 
1994).  In light of these facts, it is hardly surprising that there is evidence of collusive pricing behavior as 
well as practices to restrict entry (Nasr et al., 1992).  
Many analyses of FTAs have employed the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns 
to scale. And advocates of FTAs often argue that the gains from such trade agreements will be larger if 
features of imperfect competition and increasing economies of scale are incorporated in the analysis. 
However, the theory of trade policy and imperfect competition is by no means conclusive on this point. In 
fact, it is equally possible that the gains will be smaller (or losses larger) when these features are taken 
into account. 
A more general question is whether such FTAs are good for the developing country partner. 
Negotiating, implementing and monitoring such agreements is a costly process, and detracts from 
potential time and money spent on multilateral negotiations. A critical question is how the economic 
benefits from FTA compare to those from multilateral trade liberalization. The desirability of unilateral 
                                                 
1  A recent side agreement between the two sides expanded duty-free quantities for some agricultural products 
exported by Morocco to EU in exchange for preferential access by Morocco to selected food imported from the EU. 
2  Since 1977 there has been a Morocco-EU preferential agreement that allows Morocco’s industrial goods to enter 
the EU duty-free. 
3  The 1995 census, collected by the Ministry of Commerce, included 6040 establishments covering 180 4-digit-




versus regional preferential agreements continues to draw attention in the trade literature (Panagariya, 
2002, 2003; Bandara and Yu, 2003). In the case of Morocco, a key question is whether FTA with the 
European Union will lock Morocco into a narrow band of industrial specialization in a few labor-
intensive industries. Morocco has been successful in these sectors in the past, particularly textiles and 
apparel, but she may have more difficulty replicating this success in the future as EU’s trade barriers 
against Asian competitors fall. In light of these tradeoffs, we also consider the alternative of incremental 
multilateral liberalization.  
In this paper we apply a multi-sector, multi-region AGE model in which firms in imperfectly 
competitive industries, hold a Cournot conjecture vis-à-vis domestic rivals and Bertrand conjectures vis-
à-vis foreign competitors.  AGE models featuring imperfect competition have not been used as 
extensively in the developing country context.  Where such work exists, the role of market structure often 
has a weak empirical basis (Devarajan and Rodrik, 1988; Brown et al., 1996).  However, more commonly 
it is ignored altogether (Cogneau and Tapinos, 1995; Rutherford et al., 1997).  This is problematic, given 
that imperfect competition and economies of scale are likely to be more important in trade policy analysis 
of developing than of developed countries (Rodrik, 1988).  Undoubtedly, the lack of firm and industry 
level data has prevented modelers from constructing more empirically satisfying AGE models of 
developing countries.  This study seeks to address these gaps, by using detailed firm level data from the 
Moroccan manufacturing census to calibrate markups and unrealized scale economies for Morocco.  
Another issue we address is the potential impact of FTA as well as multilateral liberalization on the 
aggregate demand for labor. This is of the highest priority for Morocco, given the very high rate of 
unemployment among unskilled workers. Recent estimates place this between 15% and 20%. These high 
unemployment rates are due to various policy-induced rigidities.  Unlike most developing countries, 
Morocco maintains two minimum wages, one for agriculture and a second for non-farm sectors. These are 
periodically increased in real terms, and typically at a rate higher than labor productivity, so that they 
continue to be binding (Azzam, 1997). Other labor market features that affect the cost of hiring include: 
national and sectoral wage bargaining for skilled workers, compulsory social-security coverage and 
restrictive hiring and firing regulations.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides an overview of Morocco’s 
foreign trade and its close ties to the European Union. Section 3 describes the theoretical underpinning of 
the numerical analysis drawing on the Baldwin-Venables welfare decomposition.  Section 4 describes the 
empirical model and our approach to calibration.  Section 5 presents the simulation results while section 6 
concludes.  
II. Morocco’s Foreign Trade Patterns And European Union’s Critical Role  
The EU dominates Morocco’s foreign trade. The share of total merchandise products exported to the EU 
rose from 63.5 percent in 1994, to 74.3 percent in 2000 (Table 2).  In 1998, the EU market accounted for 
over 71 percent of fruits and vegetables exports from Morocco, and close to 95 percent of clothing (table 
3).  Manufactured goods are also exported predominantly to the EU.  Only minerals (mostly phosphates) 
and derived chemical products are exported in a greater proportion to non-EU countries. Imports of 
manufactures to Morocco – mostly intermediate goods and capital equipment, originate primarily from 
the EU, with sectoral shares ranging from 56 to 90 percent, and an overall average of 73% (Table 3). 
Morocco’s close trade exchanges with the European Union date from colonial ties with France but 
have been reinforced by bilateral preferential trade agreements over the last few decades.  The first 
preferential agreement between Morocco and the EU was concluded in 1969. This provided for duty free 
access in industrial goods from Morocco while imposing restrictions on Morocco’s agricultural exports to 
the EU in line of with the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. This first preferential agreement stimulated 
investments in selective manufacturing activities, targeting import substitution products for domestic 
market and labor-intensive products for exports to the EU- particularly clothing.  This contributed to a 




agriculture and food products, declined from over 70 percent to less than 25 percent, while the export 
share of manufactures climbed from less than 10 percent to 70 percent of total exports, in the same period. 
This structural shift in trade patterns has been significantly affected by the selective preferential access 
offered by the EU; namely free access to industrial goods, but restrictive access to agriculture and 
processed food.   
A close examination of Morocco trade patterns over this period reveals that a narrow manufacturing 
specialization dominated by labor-intensive activities, dictated by the type of preferential access offered 
by EU. This is illustrated by the pattern of textile and clothing trade between Morocco and the EU over 
the last 3 decades as shown in figure 1. This sector has shown the largest expansion of all manufacturing 
industries with export shares to the EU rising from 3.5% of total value of exports in the early 1970’s to 
38.7% in the late 1990’s. Much of the growth in production and trade in textiles and clothing has 
developed along a close two-way expansion of trade with the EU with very little geographical 
diversification, as evidenced by the very modest growth in trade with ROW (Figure 1). The EU 
preferences, coupled with restrictive rules of origin, played a key role in the clothing sector expansion in 
Morocco at a time when many of its potential competitors were still under restricted market access. 
Economic reforms in the 1980’s and the gradual opening of the Moroccan economy, have had limited 
effect on the diversification of production and trade. An exception is the light manufacturing sector 
(mostly electronic components) which has grown significantly in the latter part of the1990’s and which 
saw its exports expanding both to the EU and third countries.   
In summary, Morocco’s over-reliance on trade with Europe makes her vulnerable to external shocks 
from the EU. Moreover, during the 1990’s, Morocco has become increasingly sensitive to global 
competition and the erosion of preferences, as the EU has concluded similar FTA’s with many other third 
countries. In addition, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing has been expanding quotas on imports 
from Morocco’s competitors since the advent of the Uruguay Round implementation period. These 
factors have had negative impact on Morocco’s GDP which increased on average by a mere 2.7 percent in 
1990’s, compared to 3.9% in 1980’s (IMF, 2001). In this context, it is important to ask whether further 
bilateral liberalization with the EU is the right direction for Morocco’s international trade policy to go. As 
will be shown in the next section this is a complex issue, and the answer cannot be determined solely on 
the basis of theoretical arguments. Therefore, this paper will address this question empirically.   
III. Economics of the FTA: A Small Country Perspective 
To help identify the competing forces at work in determining the small country impacts of an FTA, and to 
facilitate the analysis of the numerical results, this section provides a brief exposition of the main 
channels of welfare changes under the FTA using the decomposition proposed by Baldwin and Venables 
(1995).  They break down the welfare effects of an FTA in terms of the regional household’s indirect 
utility function: V(p,E), in the following way:  
dIrdxXadXatpmdptdmVdV xE ]1)/~[(][/ −+−−++−= ρ    (1) 
The first term in the RHS of (1) represents the trade volume effects whereby net imports (m) are subject 
to a price wedge created by trade barriers ( t ), so that changes in imports have first order effects on 
welfare.   This volume of trade effect suggests that trade reform will increase welfare by spurring imports 
in sectors where domestic prices are kept above world prices.  However, following a regional trade 
agreement, increased imports from the partner country may also accompany an import decline from third 
countries. Whether trade creation or trade diversion dominates, when tariffs or partner country imports are 
eliminated, will depend on the initial tariff levels, as well as the trade elasticities, used in the model. 
The second term, mdp , represents the “terms-of-trade” effect whereby a decrease in the world price 
(dp<0) of net imports (m>0) is welfare increasing. The third and fourth terms represent the effects under 




the welfare impact of changes in output (dX) in industries where domestic price (p + t) differs from 
average cost (a).  Ceteris paribus, resource reallocation to sectors in which such excess profits exist is 
desirable. This creates a potential conflict with the desired outcome from the first term (“trade volume” 
effect).  In the Moroccan case, import-competing sectors are more oligopolistic than the export-oriented 
ones. Therefore the welfare-improving effects from the first term require that the former sectors contract 
to make room for cheaper imports, whereas the effect from the third term suggests just the opposite.   
The fourth term ( dxXa x ) is the “scale” effect whereby increased output per firm (dx>0) lowers 
average cost ( xa ), thereby reducing the cost of producing total output (X).  This term captures the effect 
of unrealized economies of scale (average cost is higher than marginal cost so that 0<xa ). This too, 
leads to a potential conflict with the trade volume effect, since an expansion of average firm output is 
required for welfare to increase from this “scale” effect.  However, when industry exit is possible, output 
per firm can increase, even as total industry output falls. This rationalization of industry output may allow 
for both higher imports (as desired from the volume of trade effects) and expanded output per firm (as 
desired by the scale effects).  This cannot be predicted a priori, which is why a formal model is required.   
The last term on the RHS of equation (1) represents the accumulation effect.  A change in investment 
is instantaneously costly, but augments capital stock with social rate of return r~ , which is discounted 
back to the present at discount rate ρ , giving present value ρ/~r . Change in investment has a first-order 
welfare effect if this ratio differs from one.   
In examining the welfare implications for Morocco from implementing the FTA with the EU, we 
emphasize the static welfare effects, including the volume-of-trade, profit-shifting, and scale effects.  In 
the absence of information on ρ/~r , it is difficult to say much about the welfare effects of foreign capital 
inflows following the FTA. On the other hand, we will take account of some considerations not shown in 
(1). In particular, we will explore the interactions between the trade policy shock and domestic taxes and 
subsidies, including those adjustments required to maintain revenue neutrality. While these terms – which 
may be very numerous indeed -- have been omitted from the elegant theoretical decomposition offered in 
equation (1), they are readily captured in our empirical decomposition. 
IV. The Applied General Equilibrium Model  
Empirical analysis of the Morocco-EU FTA is carried out using a modified version of the multi-region 
applied general equilibrium model, GTAP v. 6.1 (Hertel, 1997)4.  The model features imperfect 
competition and scale economies building on the work of Francois and Roland-Holst (1997) and Francois 
(1998).  A distinguishing feature of this analysis is that the calibration of oligopoly behavior and scale 
economies for the Moroccan manufacturing sectors is based on detailed industrial census data.  The 
empirical implementation distinguishes three regions, Morocco, the European Union (EU) and rest of 
world (ROW).  Each economy has 28 sectors, of which 14 refer to manufacturing activity.  The latter are 
characterized by economies of scale and oligopolistic market structures.  The remaining sectors 
encompass agriculture, natural resources, and services activities, and are typified by constant returns to 
scale in production and perfectly competitive behavior5.  We next turn to a detailed exposition of the 
imperfect competition and scale economies features of the model.  
4.1. Scale Economies 
                                                 
4  The GTAP model is implemented using the GEMPACK software (Harrison and Pearson, 1996). The current 
version of the model code may be downloaded from the GTAP web site: www.gtap.org. 
5  There are some sectors within the broad service aggregate that are also oligopolistic (e.g., communications).  
However, these are not taken into account due to problems of aggregation.  Also note that the services sector is not 




Scale economies for manufacturing sectors are modeled by combining fixed costs with an average 






FCAC +=+=         (2) 
where: AC, AVC, MC, FC and x are average cost, average variable cost, marginal cost (also invariant to 
scale), fixed cost, and output per firm, respectively.  It is common in the literature (Francois, 1998) to 
calibrate fixed costs via the cost disadvantage ratio (CDR), which measures the extent to which average 
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With marginal costs that are invariant to scale, the CDR approaches zero asymptotically as output per 
firm increases6.   
 In this analysis, scale economies are assumed to be internal to the firm and are modeled by linking 
percentage changes in output with percentage changes in an input composite assuming homothetic 



















=        (4) 
where x̂ and 
∧
Z  are percentage changes in output per firm and composite input levels, respectively.  The 
term 1/(1-CDR) is the output elasticity, which also equals the ratio of average to marginal cost (AC/MC).    
4.2.  Imperfect Competition 
As noted above, most manufacturing sectors in Morocco are oligopolistic and highly concentrated.  In 
this paper, these sectors are assumed to hold different perceptions about oligopolistic interdependence 
with respect to domestic rivals, which produce a homogenous good, and foreign rivals which produce a 
differentiated good (in the sense of Armington). Following Francois and Roland-Holst (1977), the 
elasticity of substitution among imports is assumed to be equal to that between domestic and imported 
goods (non-nested CES preferences). With respect to domestic rivals, including foreign-owned firms 
producing domestically, each oligopolist holds the Cournot conjecture (namely that rivals' outputs remain 
unchanged when the firm varies its own output).  With respect to foreign rival firms, supplying 
differentiated imports, each oligopolist holds a Bertrand conjecture (that is foreign rivals’ prices are 
assumed to remain unchanged in response to a change in their own price)7.  The Cournot specification for 
oligopolistic behavior for domestic firms is a reasonable assumption given the high concentration 
industries in the Moroccan economy.  The choice of the Bertrand conjecture vis-à-vis foreign imported 
                                                 
6  An alternative method of calibrating scale economies uses the concept of minimum efficiency scale (MES).  
Besides the high correlation between MES and the Herfindhal index (de Melo and Urata, 1986), the MES measure is 
based on the assumption of U-shaped long run average cost (LRAC).  This is unattractive since the empirical 
literature supports the L-shaped LRAC curve for which the CDR is more compatible (Johnson, 1960). 
7  The approach adopted in this analysis is that proposed by Francois and Roland-Holst (1997).   It differs from other 
formulations of Cournot behavior  (e.g., Smith and Venables 1988; Willenbockel, 1994) in which firms are assumed 




goods in the Morocco case is justified since these products are highly differentiated from those supplied 
by domestic firms.  
A natural alternative to the Armington-type national-level product differentiation specification would 
be the firm-level product differentiation approach of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). However, the associated 
“variety effects”, stemming from the entry or exit of domestic firms, are likely to be misleading here, 
since the domestic manufacturing industries produce relatively undifferentiated products.   
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where P = price, =MC (constant) marginal cost, == MCPM / the power of the markup over marginal 
cost, ε = the perceived market demand elasticity, and n is the Cournot equivalent number of firms. In this 
equation, the price-markup over marginal costs varies endogenously, decreasing with the number of firms 
and decreasing with a higher market elasticity of demand. Francois and Roland-Holst show that the 
industry elasticity of demand is larger, the larger the elasticity of product substitution, and the smaller the 
sales-weighted market share of firms.8 For industries where the bulk of the sales are to the domestic 
market (e.g., beverages and tobacco) – where domestic sales are dominant - the industry demand elasticity 
will be relatively small. On the other hand, industries such as wearing apparel (84% of output is exported  
-- see Table 1) will have a larger industry demand elasticity, ceteris paribus.  
 From the point of view of the welfare decomposition outlined in (1), it is also of interest to consider 
the power of the markup over Average Cost: 
MCDR
AC
PM A )1( −==        (6) 
When this value exceeds one, firms in the sector earn positive profits, as the power of the markup 
over marginal cost (M) exceeds the output elasticity, 1/(1-CDR). On the other hand, in sectors where the 
markup is relatively small and the scale effects are strong, it is possible that firms will be incurring losses. 
When the product of the power of the markup over marginal cost is precisely equal to the inverse of the 
output elasticity, we observe zero profits. 
The potential for excess profits or losses raises the question of entry and exit. In this paper, we consider 
two alternative entry and exit assumptions.  In the first case, there is no entry or exit, so non-zero excess 
profits may arise.  These profits accrue to the regional household and are spent in the same way as other 
household income.  In order to ensure comparability of results between the entry and no entry cases, we 
avoid implementing a zero pure profits scenario.  This would confound the consequences of removing 
barriers to entry/exit – an issue of industrial policy -- with the direct impacts of trade policy.  Therefore, 
we instead assume no change in the profit margin (defined as profits share in total revenue) under the 
entry/exit assumption.  Thus if profitability in the beverages and tobacco industry falls as a result of the 
FTA, we expect that firms will leave the sector until the initial profit margin in the industry is restored. 
The appendix offers an algebraic exposition of the implications of entry and exit). The most important 
consequence of a constant profit margin in the presence of homothetic costs is the following equation 
linking changes in markups to changes in output per firm: 
∧
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This means that, if trade liberalization raises the firms’ perceived demand elasticity, and optimal markups 
fall, then output per firm will increase and there will be positive scale effects on welfare via equation (1).  
4.3.  Data and Model Calibration 
The underlying data structure for the model is the global GTAP data base, version 5.3 (Dimaranan and 
McDougall, 2002).  For purposes of this analysis, a Moroccan Social Accounting Matrix for 1990 
(Bussolo and Roland-Holst, 1993) was adapted and incorporated into the GTAP data base (Elbehri, 
1998).   
The 57-sector GTAP database is aggregated into 28 sectors for purposes of this paper (Appendix 
Table A.3).  The commodity aggregation is designed to cover the major sectors of importance to 
Morocco’s production and trade.  There are 15 manufacturing sectors including six in food processing, 
with the other 13 covering the agriculture, extractive, and service activities.  Manufacturing sectors are 
disaggregated following the two-digit Moroccan nomenclature of economic activities.  The last of the six 
processed food sectors, “other processed food”, includes Morocco’s traditional exports of canned 
vegetables, fruits, and fish.  Of the eight non-food manufacturing sectors, four are export-oriented 
industries (clothing, textiles, chemical products, wood products) while the remaining sectors are import 
substitution industries serving the domestic market (medium and heavy manufacturing, as well as 
electronics).  All 15 manufacturing sectors are treated as oligopolistic with scale economies, while 
agricultural and service sectors are assumed to be perfectly competitive for purposes of this study.9 
 Calibration of the oligopoly model and scale economies for the manufacturing sectors was based on 
detailed industrial census10 data for 1995.  To calibrate the Cournot model, Herfindhal indices and the 
model-conformable benchmark number of symmetric firms11 were combined with the perceived demand 
elasticity for each sector to obtain optimal markups via application of equation (5). Table 4 reports the 
Herfindahl index for each industry, along with the resulting power of the markup over marginal cost. Note 
the very high markups for processed sugar and beverages and tobacco, with ratios of price to marginal 
cost of more than two. The smallest markups are for products with a large export share and relatively low 
concentration indexes: wearing apparel, other food products, and textiles. 
 Estimation of the cost disadvantage ratio by sector is more problematic. The most common approach 
to CDR estimates is to compute minimum efficient scale estimates based on engineering cost studies, 
dating mostly from the 60's and 70's and compiled by Pratten (1988)12.  However, in addition to being 
very old, these studies were not conducted in the Moroccan context and are likely to bear little relation to 
the economic costs and organizational faced there. Therefore, we take a different approach, inspired by de 
Melo and Urata, (1986). We order the plants in the manufacturing survey according to gross total plant-
level sales. We then divide the survey data into two parts, each accounting for one-half of total industry 
sales. We then compute the ratio of gross output per worker in the smaller firms divided by the 
corresponding values in the larger firms. This gives us some idea of the potential cost savings due to 
greater scale of production in each industry. For very large firms, the fixed cost component will be less 
                                                 
9  As noted previously, there is evidence of market power in some of the non-manufacturing sectors – most notably 
services. However, we do not have data to support an oligopoly specification in these sectors. Furthermore, the FTA 
under analysis here does directly affect these other sectors. 
10  This is a comprehensive annual census covering 6040 firms for 1995 covering all formal sector firms with 10 or 
more employees or with 100,000 Dirhams (around $11,000) gross annual revenues. Herfindhal indices for the other 
regions of the model (EU, ROW) were taken from Haaland and Tellefsen (1994).    
11  This is the number of symmetric firms, which generates the same Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index as 
the actual observed asymmetric size distribution in the industry. This approach has been used by Smith and 
Venables (1988), Willenbockel (1994), and Mercenier (1995). 
12  Examples of analyses include Gasiorek, Smith and Venables (1988); Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1994); 




important and average costs will approach the (assumed constant) marginal cost of output. We use this 
information to obtain an estimate of the dispersion of CDRs across industries.13 To derive a set of CDRs 
consistent with the rest of the model, this industry cost ratio is taken as a first estimate of the ratio, 
AC/MC, which is also the output elasticity. This initial estimate is subsequently scaled such that overall 
profits in manufacturing are equal to zero to obtain the value used in the model. The associated CDRs are 
also reported in Table 4. They range from 0.06 in sugar refining, other food products and beverages and 
tobacco to 0.27 in motor vehicles. 
 Combining the estimated CDR with the optimal markup over marginal cost, we obtain the markup 
over average cost using equation (6). This is an estimate of the relative profitability of each sector in our 
initial data base. Note that the most profitable sector appears to be the highly concentrated beverages and 
tobacco industry, which faces relatively inelastic market demand and which evidences a relatively low 
CDR. This is followed by sugar refining and dairy processing. Due to our CDR calibration procedure, 
which ensures that excess profits in the manufacturing sector as a whole are zero, some industries also 
show evidence of losses. Meat processing, textiles and motor vehicles, all have relatively small markups 
while the survey evidence shows rather sizable output elasticities. As a result, there is insufficient revenue 
to cover fixed costs and estimated per unit profits are negative. 14 Based on the decomposition in equation 
(1), expansion of any of the loss-making sectors will contribute to a national overall welfare loss.  
4.4.  Protection, Trade, and Cost Structure Data for Morocco 
The benchmark tariff structure used in the analysis is reported in table 4.  The tariff rates in the 
version 5.3 GTAP database were updated for Morocco based on the 1996 Moroccan legislation on tariff 
rates for agricultural goods15 and other sources (IMF, 1997; Tangermann, 1997).  The database was also 
adjusted to account for zero tariffs on Moroccan industrial goods exported to the EU. Tariffs for 
processed food products were proportionately adjusted for the content of primary agricultural inputs, 
since only the non-agricultural components of processed products are imported duty-free into the EU.  
Table 4 shows that Morocco’s tariffs are relatively high compared to the EU and the rest of the world16.  
With few exceptions, all duties on Moroccan manufacturing imports are higher than ROW and they are 
much higher than the EU.  The exceptions are in food processing industries such as beverage and tobacco 
products. 
In the subsequent sections of this paper, we will examine the impact of the trade agreement between 
Morocco and the EU and was negotiated in 1996 and began its 12-year implementation period in 2000. 
This entails removing all tariffs on Morocco’s non-food manufacturing imports. In keeping with the EU’s 
approach to trade in processed food products, in the case of manufactured food products, Morocco will 
eliminate only that portion of the tariffs that protect non-agricultural inputs. Since the EU already offered 
duty free access to Moroccan imports of manufactured goods, there are no tariff cuts on the EU side, 
making this tantamount to a unilateral liberalization on Morocco’s part. 
                                                 
13  This measure of scale economies also has limitations in that we assume that differences in output per worker 
between smaller and larger establishments are due solely to scale economies.  A more precise measure would have 
sorted out the effect of the differences in capital investments between the smaller and larger establishments. 
However, data limitations precluded such a refinement.  
14  Based on this approach, we also estimate substantial losses in Morocco’s highly competitive export-oriented 
apparel sector. This does not seem plausible and the CDR in this sector is revised to give zero profits. 
15  Bulletin Officiel Number 4375 bis;  Royaume du Maroc; 6 May 1996. 
16  Despite trade liberalization reforms since the mid-1980’s, Morocco’s trade policies remain restrictive.  The un-
weighted average MFN tariff rate is 33.9 percent giving Morocco a scale of 8 out of 10 in the IMF’s index of trade 




 V. Analysis of the EU-Morocco FTA 
Aggregate Welfare Effects of the EU-FTA:  The aggregate welfare impacts of the FTA on Morocco are 
reported in Table 5. The first point to note is that Morocco loses welfare following this FTA, regardless of 
the closure assumed. The aggregate welfare decomposition in Table 5 explains why this is the case. Begin 
by considering the no-entry, full employment closure (column 1). When firms do not exit the industry, 
output per firm falls in almost all of the manufacturing sectors, and this contributes $US -305.7 million to 
the aggregate welfare loss. The other argument in the welfare decomposition that relates explicitly to the 
imperfectly competitive sectors is the profit shifting effect, which is positive ($US 149.0 million).  
Overall, the loss to the Moroccan economy is heavily influenced by the adverse terms of trade (TOT) 
effect ($US -683.2 million), which results from the effectively unilateral liberalization being undertaken 
by Morocco. In order to offset the surge in imports following the tariff cuts in manufacturing, Morocco 
must increases her exports. This tends to drive down export prices, provided the EU and ROW do not cut 
their tariffs. As a consequence, Morocco’s TOT deteriorated significantly.   
Of course, Morocco could still gain from the FTA if the first term in the welfare decomposition 
shown in equation (1) – the trade volume effect – were large enough. However, preferential liberalization 
(EU only) tends to lessen the size of the efficiency gains associated with the import surge. Cheaper 
imports from the EU are substituted for lower cost products from the ROW, thereby dampening the gains 
from displacement of high cost domestic products. Furthermore, the consumption tax increase required to 
offset the forgone tariff revenue has an adverse impact on efficiency. As a consequence, the efficiency 
gains are not large enough to offset the TOT and scale economy losses, and Moroccan welfare falls under 
the no entry/full employment scenario.  
When entry/exit is permitted, industry rationalization occurs and output per firm rises. This gives rise 
to a positive aggregate scale effect in the welfare decomposition reported in Table 5 (column 2). This is a 
marked turn-around from the no-entry case, where the scale effect represented a substantial negative 
contribution to aggregate welfare. On the other hand, the larger increases in exports under the entry/exit 
case also give rise to larger adverse TOT effects. Taken together, these continue to offset the positive 
effects of increased scale economies and increased import volumes, and Morocco loses aggregate welfare, 
although the losses are negligible when compared to the no-entry case. 
The other question of interest is how the EU-FTA interacts with aggregate labor demand. For this 
reason, we introduce real wage rigidity into our model closure. Specifically, we postulate a perfectly 
elastic supply of unskilled labor at the prevailing, fixed real wage rate. We implement this along with the 
no entry case, since real wage rigidity is generally viewed as a short run phenomenon. As can be seen 
from the aggregate results reported in Table 5, aggregate employment contracts (-8.4%) as a result of the 
EU-FTA, under the unemployment closure. The third column in Table 5 reports the welfare 
decomposition for the no-entry/unemployment closure. Clearly allowing for a variable supply of unskilled 
labor in the presence of a fixed real wage has very adverse consequences for the Moroccan economy. The 
welfare loss is now nearly 5 times as large compared to no entry, full employment case. Most of this 
additional loss is due to the diminished aggregate demand for labor (-8.4%), although the adverse scale 
effects are quite substantial as well.  
Sectoral Effects of the EU-FTA:  The impacts of the EU-Morocco FTA on the imperfectly 
competitive sectors in Morocco are reported in Table 6. The first column of this table reports the change 
in average market share facing a representative firm in each sector. As noted previously, this is a sales 
share-weighted average of the individual market shares for the Moroccan firms in the domestic, EU, and 
ROW markets. Obviously their market share is largest in the domestic market. By cutting tariffs, imports 
erode firms’ sales to this domestic market. This is evident from the last column of Table 6. At the same 
time, the real devaluation that ensues makes Moroccan firms more competitive overseas and export sales 
increase (see the second to last column of this table). So the average market share for domestic firms falls 




entry case), the perceived demand elasticity rises, and optimal markups fall. This is evident in the third 
column of the no entry results reported in the top panel of Table 6.  
Overall, output (as well as output per firm) falls in most of the manufacturing sectors of Morocco as a 
result of the EU-FTA under the no-entry scenario. The exceptions are vegetable oils, beverages and 
tobacco, apparel and light manufacturing. In beverages and tobacco, the decline in markup largely offsets 
the tariff reduction and leads to a substantial increase in exports. Wearing apparel and light manufactures 
are export-oriented (Table 1) and the increase in exports following the real depreciation in Morocco 
dominates the loss in domestic sales. 
The next block of results in Table 6 reports the impact of the EU-FTA in the presence of entry/exit. 
With the possibility of firms leaving the industry, supply response is greater, as are the changes in average 
market share, which declines as before in all but two cases. The resulting change in perceived demand 
elasticity depends, however, on the change in number of firms. It is possible that the exit of domestic 
firms could raise markups despite a lower industry average market share. However, this reversal only 
occurs in the cases of meat and dairy products, paper and motor vehicles. In general, markups fall by less 
than in the no-entry case.  
In the presence of entry/exit, there is an inverse relationship between markups and output per firm 
(Equation 7).  In the ten sectors where markups decline, output per firm increases. This gives rise to 
increased scale economies in the manufacturing sector as a whole. Sector output increases in six sectors in 
the entry/exit case (compared to four under no entry). 
VI. Comparison with Multilateral Trade Liberalization 
Given the close trade ties between Morocco and the EU, and the dependence of Morocco exports on a few 
key labor-intensive industries (apart from the restricted market access in agriculture), the Morocco-EU 
FTA doesn’t appear to help Morocco diversify its industrial productive and export base. Also, the 
projected efficiency gains from industry rationalization and resource adjustments are not big enough to 
overcome the substantial losses through TOT, that arise in the wake of this essentially unilateral 
liberalization of Morocco’s manufacturing trade with the EU. This raises the question: Can Morocco do 
better under a multi-lateral liberalization option?  We explore this option with a simple multi-lateral 
liberalization scenario that involves a 30% across the board cut in all tariffs for Morocco, the EU and 
ROW.  This is roughly the magnitude of cuts achieved under the previous multilateral negotiations (the 
Uruguay Round). It is somewhat more modest than the cuts proposed in the context of recent efforts to 
restart the Doha Round negotiations (Josling and Hathaway, 2003). Finally, in the analytical framework 
used here, the 30% cut in tariffs generates roughly the same efficiency gain from increased trade volume 
as under the EU-FTA. So we can consider these two experiments to be placed on comparable footing in 
terms of their ability to increase trade volume.  
Aggregate Welfare Effects: Under Multilateral Trade Liberalization (MTL) aggregate welfare is 
positive for Morocco under all closure assumptions (table 5, last three columns). The aggregate welfare 
decomposition reveals additional insights into this general finding. Under the no-entry closure, the 
combination of output expansion in some sectors and smaller output per firm losses in others, result in 
negligible scale economy losses overall. This is partially offset by smaller profit shifting gains ($8 million 
vs. $149 million under the FTA), but when combined, the sum of the scale and profit-shifting effects are 
now roughly zero, as opposed to -$157 million in the case of the FTA. Therefore, we conclude that 
multilateral trade liberalization interacts more favorably with Morocco’s oligopolistic industry structure 
than does the EU-FTA. 
Turning next to the trade volume effect, when export and import tax effects are summed, they are 
quite comparable between the FTA and MTL experiments. While most of Morocco’s trade is with the EU 
and these tariffs are completely eliminated, the FTA-driven efficiency gains are no larger than when all of 




lower cost ROW suppliers, and towards the EU, as well as the inclusion of agriculture in the MTL 
experiment. 
The most significant contributing factor to the positive aggregate welfare gain under MTL is the 
much smaller TOT losses.  In this case the increase in exports to required to offset the rise in imports does 
not lead to lower export prices since the EU and ROW also lower their tariffs, thereby stimulating 
demand.  The net effect is much smaller TOT losses for Morocco compared to the unilateral liberalization 
under FTA. The overall aggregate welfare gains for Morocco range from $414 million to $666million, 
depending on closures. Note from the consumption tax entry in Table 5 that, even though the 
consumption tax must still be increased to offset the loss of tariff revenue under MTL, overall efficiency 
related to consumption in Morocco rises, due to the increase in aggregate consumption under this 
scenario. 
In contrast, to the EU-FTA, MTL interacts positively with aggregate labor demand, leading to a 1.4% 
increase in aggregate employment. This leads to a further boost in aggregate welfare ($666 million vs. 
$414 million – see Table 5), beyond that obtained in the no-entry, fixed employment case. As with the 
EU-FTA, permitting entry/exit increases the welfare gains to Morocco from MTL, primarily through the 
rationalization effect, as firms exit the industry, permitting the remaining domestic firms to expand their 
scale of production.  
In summary, not only does MTL give more of the traditional welfare gains than a comparably-sized 
EU-FTA, it also interacts positively with two of the major structural features of the Moroccan economy, 
namely: the high degree of concentration and market power in some of the manufacturing sectors, and the 
high rate of unemployment amongst unskilled workers.  
Sectoral Effects: Under the fixed entry, full employment scenario (third panel of table 5) output (and 
output per firm) increase in six manufacturing sectors out of 15.  More significantly, many sectors that 
expand are export-oriented sectors for which Morocco has a comparative advantage.  These are food 
processing, beverages & tobacco, chemical products and light manufacturing. Under this scenario, 
wearing apparel shows a slight contraction, as the ROW region displaces Morocco in the EU market.  
Imports into Morocco now come from both the EU (although at much lower rates of increase than under 
the FTA), as well as from ROW, which increases sales to Morocco in 10 out of 15 manufacturing sectors 
(see Table 6). 
In the presence of entry and exit, the main difference compared to no-entry case is the wearing 
apparel that now expands moderately (1.9%). The other export-oriented sectors also grow, except for 
beverages and tobacco (b_t) and dairy products (drp) that contract under the entry/exit case.  In these 
highly concentrated sectors, markup reductions are among the highest, and as a result of industry 
rationalization, the degree of firm exit exceeds the rise of output per firm, resulting in a net decline in 
sectoral output.  In the case of wearing apparel- a comparatively low concentration industry, the extent of 
firm exit is smaller than the increase in output per firm, resulting in a net rise in sector output under free 
entry scenario.  
VII. Conclusions 
This paper has compared the potential impacts on Morocco’s welfare, production and trade, from 
implementing the Morocco-EU FTA – currently being phased in -- and incremental multilateral 
liberalization of comparable magnitude.  The analysis pays special attention to two key structural features 
of the Moroccan economy: the highly concentrated industrial sector, and the rigid real wage for unskilled 
labor that has contributed to high levels of unemployment.  Calibration of the analytical framework’s 
market structure features was based on detailed firm level industrial data using 1995 Moroccan industrial 
census.  The analysis examined the FTA and multilateral scenarios under a tax replacement closure 




firm entry and exit in the imperfectly competitive sectors, as well as the functioning of the labor market 
were tested.  
Results show that the FTA with the EU generates a welfare loss for Morocco. Much of the loss arises 
from substantial TOT losses that outweigh the modest gains in resource allocation efficiency. The latter 
are dampened due to the discriminatory nature of tariff removal under the FTA, as well as the added 
distortions from the consumption tax for revenue replacement. Many manufacturing sectors contract 
under FTA and only few export oriented sectors, such as clothing, expand production. Hence it appears 
that the main effect of FTA with the EU is to lock the Moroccan manufacturing sector even more firmly 
into its current pattern of specialization, favoring a few labor-intensive sectors such as wearing and 
apparel, for which preferential access to the EU market is significant. While this may have been attractive 
in the past, it seems like a far less satisfactory strategy today, with international trade barriers continuing 
to fall, and with Morocco facing the inevitable erosion of its trade preferences in the EU. This is 
particularly striking in the case of textiles and apparel, where the existing quotas are scheduled for 
removal at the end of 2004. In this environment, multilateral trade liberalization appears to be much more 
favorable to Morocco. Not only do the traditional efficiency gains dominate the TOT losses, but this 
liberalization strategy also interacts in a more positive way with Morocco’s highly concentrated industry 
structure, as well as increasing (as opposed to diminishing) the demand for unskilled labor in Morocco. In 
summary, Morocco would be well advised to invest more of its energy in helping to obtain a positive 
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Figure 1. Morocco’s Textiles and Clothing trade patterns (1970-1998). Source: GTAP Data 











































Table 2. Morocco's shares of total exports and imports by partner (percent)
1994 1995 1997 1998 1999 2000
EXPORTS
Eureopean Union 63.5 61.6 60.2 58.7 72.8 74.3
Other Europe 1.6 1.9 2 2.2 1.2 1.1
Middle East/Mediter 8.1 8 5.7 4.7 3.6 3.2
Japan 6.6 7.7 5.6 5.7 3.6 3.8
India 6.4 6.6 8.3 6.9 4.8 4.2
USA 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.4
Other 10.3 10.8 14.7 17.8 10.6 10.1
IMPORTS
European Union 55.9 55 51.2 55 60.1 57.4
OPEC Countries 12.1 11 12 7.4 7.4 10.5
USA 8.6 6.6 6.5 7.3 6.5 5.6
Other 20.6 22.7 25.2 25.8 21.5 22.6
Source: Banque Marocaine du Commerce Exterieur (various issues)
Table 3. Share of Morocco's exports and imports by partner (1998; percent total)
EXPORTS TO: IMPORTS FROM:
European Third Total European Third Total
Union countries Union countries
EXPORTS IMPORTS
Fruit & Veg 70.8 29.2 100 Grains 44.3 55.7 100
Minerals 46.9 53.1 100 Sugar 1.8 98.2 100
Proc Food 56 44 100 Food products 73.3 26.7 100
Textile 88.1 11.9 100 Textiles 92.2 7.8 100
Clothing 94.9 5.1 100 Clothing 93.4 6.6 100
Wood products 91.5 8.5 100 Wood products 79.4 20.6 100
Paper paste 66.7 33.3 100 Paper products 86.1 13.9 100
Chemical products 30.5 69.5 100 Chemical products 71.7 28.3 100
metal industry 86.6 13.4 100 metal industry 66.1 33.9 100
Motor & vehicles 100 0 100 Motor & vehicles 56.5 43.5 100
Light manufacturing 80.5 19.5 100 Light manufacturing 83.4 16.6 100
Other manufacturing 66.1 33.9 100 other manufacturing 73.1 26.9 100
Total 73.3 26.7 100 Total 72.5 27.5 100




Table 4. Tariff rates and Market Structure Data for Morocco (1995) 
Table 4. Tariff rates and Market Structure Data for Morocco
(percent)      Tariff rates Market structure data(b) 
Morocco                 E_U ROW Perceived Price- Price- Economies
From From Herfindhal demand marginal cost average cost of scale
MOR (a) ROW Index (c) elasticity Markup (d) Markup (d) (CDR) (e)
Primary Agriculture
Grains crops 124.00* 8.59 8.59 96.95
Vegetables-fruits 18.26 0.00/3.00 1.95 12.48
Oil seeds 90.97* 0.00 0.00 6.61
Sugar crops 4.11 35.07 35.07 36.03
Other agriculture 14.25 4.25 4.25 10.74
Livestock 4.00 5.91 5.91 11.24
Other Primary
Fishing 22.88 2.55 2.55 6.07
Forestry 11.58 0.00 0.00 1.44
Energy products 5.45 0.12 0.12 3.54
Minerals 3.41 0.00 0.00 2.44
Manufacturing
Meat products 24.00* 0.00 13.12 31.22 0.2173 4.31 1.11 1.25 0.24
Vegetable oils & fat 13.80 50.60 64.20 21.75 0.4250 3.56 1.33 1.05 0.16
Dair products 23.03 0.00 5.58 62.07 0.4254 2.04 1.49 0.91 0.13
Sugar 148.00* 5.58 5.58 62.07 0.4893 1.70 2.39 0.80 0.11
Other food products 25.30 0.00/1.50 3.29 10.32 0.0790 1.81 1.06 1.06 0.10
Beverages & Tobacco 18.91 0.00/2.30 1.84 31.23 0.7907 1.85 2.45 0.64 0.10
Textiles 27.79 0.00 1.73 20.92 0.1214 3.77 1.07 1.20 0.19
Wearing apparelf 34.04 0.00 4.90 12.16 0.0434 3.99 1.02 1.00 0.19
Wood products 12.91 0.00 0.73 4.97 0.3236 2.22 1.26 0.96 0.11
Paper & Publishing 20.59 0.00 0.52 5.55 0.2218 1.56 1.21 1.07 0.20
Chemical products 17.41 0.00 0.83 8.49 0.3892 2.37 1.35 1.00 0.16
Metal products 12.64 0.00 0.78 7.80 0.2315 1.98 1.19 0.97 0.09
Motor vehicles 21.75 0.00 1.10 9.29 0.2867 5.31 1.10 1.27 0.25
Light manufacturing 18.82 0.00 1.37 6.28 0.4138 4.19 1.21 1.06 0.15
Other maunfacturing 34.03 0.00 2.47 8.12 0.5141 2.39 1.49 0.91 0.14
Sources:  GTAP data base version 4;  tariff values with "*" were compiled from various sources.
(a) Tariff rates from Morocco into EU reflect trade agreements in force between the two partners prior to the FTA.  
(b) All manufacturing and market structure data are authors' calculations from annual manufacturing survey (Moroccan Ministry of Commerce
and Industry)
(c) Herfindhal indices for the other model regions, EU and ROW (proxied by USA) were taken from Haaland and Tellefsen (1994)
(d) Benchmark price-cost markups were calibrated from a Cournot oligopoly model using Herfindhal indices and perceived demand elasticity.
(e) Cost disadvantage ratios (CDR) were derived from the Moroccan manufacturing census data
CDR values for EU were taken from Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr (1994) and for ROW (proxied by USA) from Roland-Holst, Reinert and 
shiells (1994).
(f) For wearing apparel we scaled down the power of markup to remove profit losses in the sector which also resulted in zero profits











Table 5. Static Welfare Effects of FTA and Multi-lateral liberalization on Morocco (US 1997 millions)
FTA scenarios Multilateral liberalization scenario
No entry No entry
No entry Entry and Unempl. No entry Entry and Unempl.
Total welfare -392.0 -16.0 -1935.9 414.6 528.0 666.4
Allocative Efficiency 596.8 659.3 445.3 622.1 656.7 645.8
Labor Endowment 0.0 0.0 -1327.2 0.0 0.0 213.8
Scale Economies -305.7 68.8 -404.7 -18.7 83.1 -1.7
Terms of trade -683.2 -744.1 -649.3 -188.7 -211.8 -191.5
Allocative Efficiency 596.8 659.3 445.3 622.1 656.7 645.8
Profit shifting 149.0 126.3 173.7 8.1 -8.7 5.5
Input tax -28.0 -40.8 -35.3 -1.5 -4.8 -0.2
Consumption tax -86.1 -35.4 -198.8 9.6 17.8 21.1
Export tax 122.6 138.8 115.9 44.8 49.4 45.5
Import tax 439.2 470.4 389.9 561.1 603.1 573.9
Aggregate Labor -8.4 1.4
(percent change)





Table 6. Static FTA effects on Morocco's output, markups and trade
Average Mkt  Share Number of Markups Output per Sectoral Imports Imports Exports Domestic 
Sector  for Industry (%) firms (%) (%) firm (%) Output (%)from EU (%) from ROW (%) (%) sales (%)
FTA, NO ENTRY
Meat products -55.55 0 -0.06 -15.27 -15.27 324.61 -50.96 16.99 -42.45
Vegetable oils & fat -6.52 0 -0.20 0.24 0.24 18.74 -18.98 17.08 -4.62
Dairy products -22.19 0 -5.09 -19.55 -19.55 204.00 -47.15 39.84 -23.52
Sugar 0.42 0 0.28 -1.52 -1.52 3736.05 -10.05 8.77 -1.64
Other food products -5.75 0 -0.35 -0.57 -0.57 125.07 -17.29 14.29 -4.53
Beverages & Tobacco -2.77 0 -4.37 2.19 2.19 158.36 -52.2 102.08 0.28
Textiles -51.81 0 -0.26 -0.44 -0.44 26.72 -60.32 63.83 -33.57
Wearing apparel -44.84 0 -0.38 8.62 8.62 305.06 -67.31 77.88 -23.33
Wood products -30.83 0 -5.17 -23.32 -23.32 225.6 -64.89 88.5 -29.44
Paper & Publishing -13.66 0 -2.44 -14.76 -14.76 93.1 -42.37 40.16 -17.29
Chemical products -23.19 0 -2.35 -4.80 -4.80 68.61 -38.34 28.25 -17.00
Metal products -14.88 0 -2.74 -13.06 -13.06 134.06 -47.85 53.51 -16.02
Motor vehicles -47.51 0 -1.76 -38.47 -38.47 106.16 -82.69 204.54 -46.42
Light manufacturing -18.75 0 -0.65 10.90 10.90 26.55 -32.4 44.1 -3.24
Other maunfacturing -31.81 0 -7.57 -12.54 -12.54 162.68 -63.36 99.19 -24.68
FTA, WITH ENTRY
Meat products -55.75 -13.33 0.75 -3.03 -15.95 330.27 -50.3 15.59 -42.53
Vegetable oils & fat -4.96 1.30 -0.33 2.11 3.43 19.12 -18.72 20.41 -1.47
Dairy products -26.60 -24.68 0.41 -3.01 -26.95 247.67 -39.56 14.7 -29.73
Sugar 1.05 1.48 0.09 -0.88 0.58 3645.26 -12.18 13.4 0.43
Other food products -5.95 -1.76 -0.28 2.89 1.08 121.65 -18.54 17.39 -3.27
Beverages & Tobacco -4.83 -9.09 -0.90 9.86 -0.12 208.05 -43 68.71 -1.44
Textiles -50.50 1.25 -0.29 1.55 2.83 29.68 -59.4 67.41 -30.47
Wearing apparel -44.63 -12.27 -0.28 31.39 15.26 296.44 -68.01 91.56 -19.93
Wood products -36.11 -34.71 -0.20 1.75 -33.57 268.44 -60.27 48.82 -38.08
Paper & Publishing -15.38 -18.75 0.42 -2.03 -20.40 102.76 -39.49 26.05 -22.53
Chemical products -24.31 -11.13 -0.37 2.32 -9.07 70.91 -37.49 22.07 -20.56
Metal products -16.83 -21.62 -0.32 3.77 -18.67 147.16 -44.93 36.64 -21.12
Motor vehicles -64.38 -60.74 3.40 -11.79 -65.37 108.72 -82.48 74.2 -69.94
Light manufacturing -18.51 4.79 -1.10 8.00 13.17 22.74 -34.43 50.32 -2.65
Other maunfacturing -37.58 -32.19 -0.53 4.08 -29.43 220.3 -55.33 37.42 -36.69
MULTI-LATERAL, NO ENTRY
Meat products -84.00 0.00 -0.09 47.79 47.79 0.11 8.30 170.20 -55.37
Vegetable oils & fat -35.11 0.00 -1.02 -3.40 -3.40 -21.66 48.25 63.42 -22.71
Dairy products -11.40 0.00 -2.97 1.54 1.54 22.59 18.45 103.10 -5.26
Sugar -9.98 0.00 -5.27 -9.14 -9.14 50.81 54.26 62.26 -9.96
Other food products -6.34 0.00 -0.38 5.67 5.67 32.35 30.39 27.76 -0.22
Beverages & Tobacco -3.78 0.00 -5.76 5.30 5.30 14.24 -6.62 222.19 1.15
Textiles -15.98 0.00 -0.09 -1.58 -1.58 4.30 -0.75 15.37 -10.33
Wearing apparel -8.40 0.00 -0.10 -0.35 -0.35 48.37 45.27 8.61 -4.46
Wood products -6.22 0.00 -1.46 -3.32 -3.32 38.77 -7.03 22.11 -4.71
Paper & Publishing -3.33 0.00 -0.68 -2.59 -2.59 20.05 4.68 11.68 -3.25
Chemical products -8.75 0.00 -0.97 3.03 3.03 15.31 2.42 19.21 -2.94
Metal products -3.73 0.00 -0.83 -2.13 -2.13 26.28 -0.53 17.39 -3.00
Motor vehicles -14.38 0.00 -0.69 -9.47 -9.47 23.82 -7.19 95.03 -12.88
Light manufacturing -6.16 0.00 -0.22 2.08 2.08 5.21 3.98 10.28 -1.41
Other maunfacturing -7.33 0.00 -2.39 -1.68 -1.68 29.29 6.33 21.80 -4.23
MULTI-LATERAL, WITH ENTRY
Meat products -82.87 49.02 -1.77 7.93 60.84 0.09 8.48 193.90 -51.28
Vegetable oils & fat -35.79 -6.30 -0.21 1.35 -5.04 -20.99 49.72 59.83 -23.79
Dairy products -12.41 -8.90 -1.04 8.59 -1.08 29.06 24.79 90.25 -7.19
Sugar -14.05 -17.70 -0.29 2.88 -15.33 74.92 79.70 32.28 -15.88
Other food products -6.53 1.44 -0.45 4.66 6.16 31.08 29.34 29.25 0.01
Beverages & Tobacco -6.43 -11.81 -1.12 12.47 -0.81 46.09 19.40 143.40 -3.57
Textiles -15.80 -1.45 -0.04 0.20 -1.25 4.67 -0.38 15.50 -9.89
Wearing apparel -8.65 -4.06 -0.06 5.47 1.19 46.04 43.09 11.58 -3.58
Wood products -7.08 -7.90 -0.34 3.04 -5.10 43.56 -3.84 16.53 -6.29
Paper & Publishing -3.58 -4.02 -0.08 0.38 -3.65 21.20 5.68 9.62 -4.26
Chemical products -8.86 -1.62 -0.69 4.42 2.72 15.15 2.33 19.02 -3.29
Metal products -4.08 -5.53 -0.20 2.28 -3.37 28.09 0.90 14.36 -4.16
Motor vehicles -17.64 -15.97 0.10 -0.40 -16.30 24.49 -6.95 80.51 -19.46
Light manufacturing -5.98 0.64 -0.28 1.95 2.61 4.10 2.94 11.68 -1.26
Other maunfacturing -8.50 -8.54 -0.50 3.85 -5.02 37.84 13.35 11.20 -6.78






Appendix A:  GTAP Model Description 
A.1.  Intermediate and Final Demand 
Demand for intermediate inputs is modeled via a two-stage CES function.  In the lower stage, a 
CES function is used to aggregate each imported good, differentiated by region of origin into a 
single import composite (Hertel, 1997; chapter 2).  A second CES function aggregates imports 
and domestically produced goods into a single composite good (Armington assumption). Firms 
first decide on the sourcing of their imports and then based on the resulting price of the import 
composite, determine the optimal mix of imported and domestic goods.  Although the same 
value of Armington substitution elasticity is used across uses (final versus intermediate demand) 
firms or consumers' composite import demand are distinguished by their different import shares.   
Final demand is treated via a regional household, which receives all income that is generated 
in the economy including factor income, quota rents, and net taxes adjusted for the value of 
depreciation.  Regional income is allocated to private consumption, government and savings 
according to a Cobb Douglas utility function.  Consumers’ utility takes the form of a Constant 
Difference Elasticity (CDE) minimum expenditure function (Hanoch 1975).  This functional 
form allows for non-homothetic preferences, which are important when per capita income 
changes significantly.  The CDE form also lends itself to calibration based on existing data on 
income and own-price elasticities (Hertel et al., 1992).   
 There are five factors of production (land, unskilled labor, skilled labor, capital and natural 
resources) in fixed supply with labor and capital mobile across sectors while land and natural 
resources are sector-specific.  Perfect mobility of labor and capital across sectors means that 
wage and rental rates are equalized across sectors.  In this analysis, the aggregate economy-wide 
level of unemployment implicit in the benchmark data base is assumed to be unaffected in the 
long run by the FTA17.  In the formation of a value added composite, firms substitute among the 
five primary factors using a common elasticity of factor substitution (farmland is exclusively 
employed in agriculture and extractive natural resources are also sector-specific). 
Welfare is derived at the regional level as an equivalent variation computed from regional 
income and prices, based on the regional household’s utility function.  Moreover, it can be 
decomposed into component parts using an approach developed by Huff and Hertel (1996).  This 
decomposition approach may be viewed as a generalization of Baldwin and Venables’ analytical 
decomposition, which accommodates domestic distortions and handles non-marginal changes via 
numerical integration.  
                                                 
17  The analysis assumes that wages are market-determined such that the base-year unemployment rate is unaffected 
by the FTA.  This assumption, however, could be relaxed by fixing wages and allowing aggregate labor demand to 




A.2. Derivation Of Perceived Demand Elasticity  
 The derivation of the perceived demand elasticity for a given industry starts from the demand 




−−= σσσ θα          (6) 
where riX , is demand by region r for goods of origin i, riP ,  is price of commodity in region r of 
origin i, rθ  is price index in region r dual to the Armington aggregator, rE  is total expenditure 
value of region r on the commodity group, and σ  is elasticity of substitution between goods of 
different origin – assumed to be identical across all regions.   
 By assumption, both domestic and export markets are integrated – that is domestic firms are 
not able to engage in regional price discrimination, but face a single, world-wide market demand 
curve for their product, and thus have only one decision variable (namely their total quantity to 




rii XX (.)(.) ,          (7) 
Assuming total constant expenditure for the composite commodity, a general form of the 











σσε ∑−+=−=        (8) 
where the hat notation is used to indicate proportional changes. 
Now the elasticity of the share rθ with respect to iP  depends on domestic i firms’ conjectures 





































S          (10) 
denotes the market share of goods from region k in region r within the commodity group under 
consideration.   Now we assume that the firms take foreign rival’ prices as given, so that: 
0ln/ln =ik PdPd  for ik ≠  (the Bertrand assumption).  The perceived market demand elasticity 
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A.3. Entry and Exit Model Specification 
 
To explore the implications of this, begin with the following equation which determines 
profits per unit of output: 
Π++=
x
FCAVCP       (7) 
The combination of the optimal markup and zero profit conditions, (5) and (7), has strong 
implications for the relationship between the markup and the scale of production in the entry-exit 
equilibrium.  This may be seen most readily by totally differentiating (7), and subtracting 
∧
∏Ω P  






Ω−ΠΩ+−Ω+Ω=Ω− PxFCAVCPP Fv ˆ)ˆ(
^
    (8) 
where ∏ΩΩΩ andFv , are the shares of variable costs, fixed costs, and profits in total revenue 







Ω−−ΠΩ+−Ω+Ω= PxFCAVCP Fv     (9) 
But the change in price is also linked to the optimal power of the markup )(M  and marginal 
costs via (5), so that: 
∧∧∧
+= CMP        (10) 






Ω−−ΠΩ+−Ω+Ω=+ PxFCAVCAVCM Fv  (11) 
But we have also assumed a homothetic cost structure, such that the input composition of fixed 
and variable costs is the same. Therefore, these costs change at the same rate, as factor prices 
change.  Thus, 
∧∧







Ω−−ΠΩ+Ω−Ω−=+ PxAVCAVCM F   (12) 
Canceling the 
∧
AVC terms from both sides and setting the change in the unit profit rate equal to 
zero, we have the following relationship between markups and output per firm: 
xM F ˆ]}1/[{ ∏
∧
Ω−Ω−=       (13) 




















Appendix Table A1. Composition of Morocco's exports to EU and third countries 
(1970-98; % of total exports by destination)
1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-98
EXPORTS TO EU
AgProd 75.0 59.6 40.6 32.1 21.6 13.0
Clothing 3.5 9.7 16.5 31.3 45.1 38.7
ChemIndus 1.1 3.6 7.1 6.7 7.3 6.7
LightMnfct 0.4 1.4 2.6 4.5 6.5 8.7
OthMnfct 2.6 4.3 6.3 5.7 4.9 3.9
Other 17.4 21.4 26.8 19.7 14.6 29.0
EXPORTS TO ROW
AgProd 55.0 41.7 20.9 17.9 23.5 21.4
Clothing 2.1 4.9 5.1 7.9 6.5 5.5
ChemIndus 4.1 14.5 39.6 36.5 34.0 26.1
LightMnfct 1.6 0.4 0.4 1.8 5.0 5.5
OthMnfct 14.6 9.9 4.9 6.9 8.0 4.7
Other 22.7 28.5 29.2 29.1 23.0 36.9




Appendix Table A2. Scale and markup effects for oligopolistc manufacturing sectors 
under FTA and Multilateral liberalization for Morocco
           NO ENTRY       WITH ENTRY 
Scale Markup Scale Markup
effects effects effects effects
FTA
Meat products -0.38 0.32 -0.07 0.31
Vegetable oils & fat 0.08 -0.02 0.72 -0.32
Dairy products -9.97 -3.57 -1.10 -9.28
Sugar -1.37 -3.37 -0.82 1.32
Other food products -2.34 1.43 11.69 -2.64
Beverages & Tobacco 0.68 3.70 2.88 -0.18
Textiles -1.76 1.47 3.78 -5.63
Wearing apparel 7.31 -1.83 22.81 -1.08
Wood products -24.04 1.52 1.91 -10.18
Paper & Publishing -48.30 21.60 -5.57 21.68
Chemical products -30.59 2.38 13.54 -0.87
Metal products -56.69 -7.28 13.76 -28.99
Motor vehicles -167.08 148.81 -25.74 193.62
Light manufacturing 37.10 -13.63 28.54 -17.76
Other maunfacturing -8.32 -2.51 2.44 -13.69
Total -305.67 149.02 68.77 126.31
MULTI-LATERAL
Meat products 0.90 -0.72 0.21 -1.16
Vegetable oils & fat -1.18 0.36 0.43 0.48
Dairy products 0.70 0.39 3.65 -0.37
Sugar -8.68 -17.12 2.42 -34.14
Other food products 22.69 -13.55 18.93 -14.98
Beverages & Tobacco 1.68 8.89 3.61 -1.52
Textiles -4.18 3.61 0.51 2.84
Wearing apparel -0.32 0.04 4.79 -0.09
Wood products -3.17 -0.76 2.71 -1.59
Paper & Publishing -8.22 3.03 1.17 3.96
Chemical products 18.99 -0.04 27.33 0.27
Metal products -8.95 -2.82 9.16 -5.33
Motor vehicles -35.56 30.30 -1.36 48.93
Light manufacturing 7.64 -2.86 7.21 -3.62
Other maunfacturing -1.08 -0.68 2.32 -2.38
Total -18.74 8.08 83.09 -8.71





Appendix Table A3. Commodity Aggregation and Mapping with the GTAP V4 Sectoral Classification 
Model sectors: GTAP sectoral classification:
Agriculture & Other Primary sectors:
1 Grains crops   Paddy rice (pdr); Wheat (wht); Cereal grains nec (gro)
2 Vegetables-fruits   Vegetables, fruit, nuts (v_f)
3 Oil seeds   Oil seeds (osd)                                       
4 Sugar crops   Sugar cane, sugar beet (c_b)
5 Plant-based fibers   Plant-based fibers (pfb)                             
6 Other agriculture   Crops nec (ocr);  Wool silk-worm cocoons (wol)
7 Livestock   Bovine cattle, sheep and gots, horses (ctl); 
  Animal products nec (oap); Raw milk (rmk)
8 Fishing   Fishing (fsh)                                         
9 Forestry   Forestry (for)
10 Energy products   Coal (col); Oil (oil); Gas (gas); 
  petroleum coal products (p_c)                                           
11 Minerals   Minerals nec (omn)                                    
Manufacturing:
12 Meat products   Bovine cattle, sheep, goat, horse meat products (cmt); 
  Meat products nec (omt) 
13 Vegetable oils & fat   Vegetable oils and fats (vol)                         
14 Dairy products   Dairy products (mil)                                 
15 Sugar   Sugar (sgr)                                          
16 Other food products  Processed rice pcr); Food products nec (ofd)                            
17 Beverages & Tobacco   Beverages and tobacco products (b_t)                  
18 Textiles   Textiles (tex)                                       
19 Wearing apparel   Wearing apparel (wap); Leather products (lea) 
20 Wood products   Wood products (lum)                                   
21 Paper & Publishing   Paper products, publishing (ppp)
22 Chemical products   Chemical, rubber, plastic products (crp)
23 Metal products   Mineral products nec (nmm); Ferrous metals (i_s); 
  Metals nec (nfm); Metal products (fmp)                           
24 Motor vehicles   Motor vehicles and parts  (mvh);                       
  Transport equipment nec (otn)
25 Light manufacturing   Electronic equipment (ele);          
  Machinery and equipment nec (ome)                   
26 Other maunfacturing   Manufactures nec (omf)                                
Services:
27 Utilities   Electricity (ely); Gas manufacture distribution (gdt); 
  water (wtr)  
28 Other services   Construction (cns); Trade, transport (t_t); 
  Financial, business, recreational services (osp);   
  Public admin and defence, education, health (osg);  
  Dwellings (dwe)   
